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THE MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM:
IMPACT ON THE FRAIL ELDERLY AND AN
ALTERNATIVE REIMBURSEMENT FORMULA
PHOEBE

D.

SHARKEY*

JUNE BUCKLE**
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. health care system is in the midst of unprecedented change. New health care delivery systems and financing mechanisms are reshaping the health care arena. The
thrust of these changes with respect to medical care for most
Americans and their implications for the future are difficult
issues to assess. In this article we discuss implementation of
the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) and the impact of its financial incentives. We specifically identify the
ramifications of this cost containment effort on the frail elderly population and suggest a modification to PPS which
would provide hospitals more equitable reimbursement for
their care. Recent legislation in the state of Pennsylvania is
presented illustrating the potential of implementing this
modification.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the past twenty years, powerful economic and demographic forces have influenced health care costs in both the
public and private sectors. Both increased demand and price
inflation have contributed to steeply rising health care expenditures. In 1965, the passage of Medicare and Medicaid
legislation insured equal access to high quality health care for
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the elderly and the poor.' These programs enabled a large
segment of the population, who might otherwise not have received health care, to do so. At the same time, private industry further influenced the demand for health care as more
comprehensive health insurance was provided to employees.'
Widespread participation in group health plans enabled most
employees and their families to have almost unlimited access
to health care services. The growth of third party payers reduced the direct cost of health care to the consumer, thus
encouraging greater demand of these services.
While increasing demand, Medicare legislation also introduced the concept of cost-based reimbursement. All reasonable costs would be reimbursed. Such arrangements provided little or no incentive for health care providers to limit
expenditures. When the third party insurer paid all or almost
all of the costs incurred, neither the consumer nor the health
care provider needed to be cost conscious.
Coincident with increased demand, there has been a
rapid growth in price inflation in the medical sector. Every
year since 1965, inflation in medical care prices has exceeded
the general rate of inflation for the economy as a whole.3
The reasons for this increase are in part explained by increased demand, but an additional factor has been the increase in intensity of care. Today, in contrast to 1965, hospitalization encompasses more ancillary services, more tests
using more expensive and sophisticated equipment, and more
labor and supplies.
1. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. 1, 79
Stat. 290 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 to 1396q (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)).

2.

D.

CHOLLET,

EMPLOYER-PROVIDED

HEALTH

BENEFITS, COVERAGE,

PROVISIONS AND POLICY IssuEs, 3 (1984).

3. Ratios by year for Consumer Price Index (CPI)/Medical Care %
annual increase are:
YEAR
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983

% Annual increase
% Annual increase
% Annual increase
CPI/Medical
YEAR
CPI/Medical
YEAR
CPI/Medical
1.7% 9.2%
1966
2.9% 10.4%
1967
2.9% 10.8%
4.2% 13.4%
1969
5.4% 12.8%
1970
5.9% 13.4%
4.3% 11.5%
1972
3.3% 12.3%
1973
6.2% 10.3%
11.0% 12.8%
1975
9.1% 12.1%
1976
5.8% 12.8%
6.5% 13.1%
1978
7.7% 11.9%
1979
11.3% 13.5%
13.5% 15.6%
1981
10.4% 15.7%
1982
6.1% 12.8%
3.2% 10.4%
1984
4.3% 9.2%
1985
3.6% 8.9%

CPI annual % increase source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Historical Tables
Annual Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1986; Health expenditures annual %
change source: National Health Care Expenditures, 5 Health Care Fin. Rev.
56 (Winter 1983) and 8 Health Care Fin. Rev. 102 (Winter 1986).
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America is also growing older. The number of persons
who are 65 and older has grown and will continue to grow at
staggering rates. This is one of the most significant facts affecting our present and future. In 1900, one in 25 Americans
was age 65 and older. By 1984, one in eight was at least 65
years of age. Of the approximately 28 million Americans who
were then at least 65 years of age, 16.6 million were age 65
to 74 years, 8.8 million were 75 to 84 years old and 2.6 million were over 85 years. This "older" population grew at
twice the rate of the rest of the population in the last two
decades. The "very old" population, or those 85 and over, is
also growing rapidly and is expected to increase seven times
by the year 2050.'
Today, chronic conditions are the most prevalent health
problem for the elderly. More than four out of five persons,
who are 65 and over, have at least one chronic condition and
often have multiple problems. In 1982, the leading chronic
conditions among the elderly were arthritis, hypertensive disease, hearing impairments and heart conditions. Digestive
conditions, genitourinary conditions and injuries were the
leading causes of hospitalization among the elderly. The
types of conditions experienced by older persons vary by sex
and race. Older men often experience acute illnesses that are
life threatening, while older women usually have chronic illnesses which cause physical limitations. Race discrimination
also exists. In general, the health of aging blacks is poorer
than that of aging whites.
Advanced age, stroke, confusion and falls have been
cited as the major reasons for prolonged hospital stays among
the elderly. Heart disease, cancer, and stroke account for
over three-quarters of all deaths. They also account for 40
percent of hospital days and 50 percent of all disability days.5
Since the 1950s, heart disease has remained the major cause
of death for the elderly.6 The aging of America has far
4. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Pub. No. PF 3377-1085, Aging America: Trends and Projections 5 (1984).
5. Maquire, Taylor, & Stout, Elderly Patients in Acute Medical Wards:
Factors Predicting Length of Stay in Hospital, 292 Hosp. Topics 1251-53
(1986).
6. Dep't Health & Hum. Serv., supra note 4; Dunn, Arteriosclerotic
Heart Disease in the Elderly, 4 Cardiology Clinics 253-61 (1986); Kannel &
Gordon, Evaluation of Cardiovascular Risk in the Elderly: The Framingham
Study, 54 BULL. N.Y. ACAD, MED. 573-91 (1978); Thoud, Coronary Heart Disease in the Aged, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1089-93 (1965).
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reaching implications for increasing health care costs because
of the higher probability of health problems and higher demand for health and social services."
II.

REIMBURSEMENT REFORM

Since the late 1960's, efforts by both the federal government and third party payers have resulted in a variety of approaches to reduce escalating health care costs. Among the
most important of these efforts have been proposals to introduce competition into the health care market and legislation
to reform the ways in which health care providers are reimbursed by third party payers. Pro-competition proposals seek
to provide incentives to the consumer to become more cost
conscious with respect to health care consumption. For example, legislation has been introduced requiring employers to
offer a choice of health plans with significant variation in coverage and greater cost sharing requirements.' Today, many
employers have initiated multiple health insurance options as
a mechanism for encouraging greater cost sharing by the
consumer and greater awareness of the cost of health care
resource consumption.
Because hospitalization insurance coverage has traditionally been the most complete, much of the inflationary impact
of third party reimbursement practices has been observed in
increased hospital charges for inpatient care. Reimbursement
reform to regulate hospital charges has been effective for several states and the federal government. Regulatory cost containment efforts have included state programs for disclosure
and voluntary or mandatory review of hospital charges.'
A.

Medicare Prospective Payment Legislation:

In 1983, Congress enacted legislation establishing the
Medicare Prospective Payment System which significantly altered previous federal payment mechanisms.10 The conven7. Victor & Vetter, Poverty, Disability and Use of Services by the Elderly:
Analysis of the 1980 General Household Survey, 22 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1087-91
(1986); Gifford, Furberg, Ostfield, Perry, Schneper, Roccel la & Bowler, A
Statement on Hypertension in the Elderly, 256 J. A.M.A. 70-74 (1986).
8. See, e.g., H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5740, 96th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1980); S.433, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
9. Espposito, Abstracts of State Legislated Hospital Cost-Containment
Programs, 4 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 129-158 (Winter 1982).
10. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(1983).

19881

THE MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM

tional practice of retroactive reimbursement of hospital costs
for patient care was replaced with a prospective payment plan
for Medicare patients nationwide. In an attempt to encourage
a more efficient level of operation within the health care delivery system, financial incentives were thus changed from a
retroactive cost-based system to a prospective payment system. With a prospective system, hospitals would be at financial risk if resource use exceeded the payment level.
The new system for prospective payment of Medicare patients provided that most hospitals in the United States would
be reimbursed a fixed fee for each Medicare patient. The
amount of the payment would depend primarily on the disease group to which the patient was assigned. The law initially established 20 sets of rates for 467 Diagnostic Related
Groups (DRGs)."1 Urban and rural rates were set for each of
nine geographic regions as well as at the national level. Use
of DRG national payment rates has been phased in over five
years, so that by 1988 hospitals will be reimbursed using a
completely national DRG system.
DRGs are a patient classification system based on groups
of patients who require similar regimens of care and therefore are expected to consume similar patterns of hospital resources. Patients are grouped by discharge diagnosis, secondary diagnoses, operating room procedures, age and
sometimes disposition. Hospitals will be paid on a per case
basis with each hospital's reimbursement equal to the number
of patients discharged in each DRG multiplied by the reimbursement rate for that DRG.
The Medicare Prospective Payment system has set rates
for each DRG using essentially an average cost formula. The
PPS legislation is designed to reduce inefficiency and encourage cost-effective care. How successful it will be in
achieving cost savings depends on how effective a DRG average cost payment will be in providing hospitals with the
proper signals to encourage efficiency. Certainly hospitals
with costs below the payment rate will not be given strong
incentives to identify and control institutional inefficiencies.
Although there may be some effort to decrease costs, as this
provides "money in their pockets," this motivation for reducing costs may not be significant. For those hospitals with costs
above the average, there are incentives to provide treatment
in a more efficient manner. This may result in these hospitals
11. See 48 Fed. Reg. 39, 752 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 405,
409, 489).
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not only seeking cost efficient methods of production, but
may also result in some less desirable impacts such as "skimming" low-cost patients and "dumping" or refusing to admit
high-cost patients. In particular, the frail elderly are prime
targets for practices which raise difficult legal and ethical
questions. Further, an average cost payment may not be an
equitable payment if those hospitals operating at costs above
the average have "justifiable" costs (e.g. advanced technology
such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging or "MRI") which
should not be reduced, for whatever reason, in the interest of
efficiency.
The area of payment for advanced technology is particularly troublesome under the DRGs. There are those who fear
that prospective payment rates will decrease the acquisition
and utilization of advanced technology.' Many new technologies that may be safer and more effective, such as MRIs and
Low Osmolar Contrast dye, were not available or accepted
practice at the time the current payment rates were calculated. Further, the periodic recalibration of payment rates
creates a lag between accepted medical practice and adjustment of DRG payments. Therefore, advanced time saving
technologies may not be affordable under the PPS.
B.

The Medicare Prospective Payment System: Impact of
FinancialIncentives

Efficiency in the production of hospital services is very
difficult to assess. In the health care sector, the difficulties inherent in measuring the output of hospitals are not totally
solved by the DRG patient classification scheme. For example, variations in severity of illness and quality of care are not
differentiated in the DRG grouping of patients. Therefore,
the observable cost differences among hospitals for a single
DRG are not good indicators of efficiency differences. To
base a payment formula on the average cost observed in a
region (or eventually across the nation accounting for wage
differences) may be a crude mechanism for encouraging efficiency and may in some instances create the wrong
incentives.
When Medicare reimbursements are inadequate to cover
costs, some hospitals have shifted charges to private, chargebased payers in order to compensate for revenue shortfalls.
12. Anderson & Steinberg, To Buy or Not to Buy: Technology Acquisition
Under Prospective Payment, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 182-85 (July 9, 1984).
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This charge shifting can produce inefficiencies and inequities.
Charge shifting represents a cross-subsidy with one payer
subsidizing the benefits of another payer. It is questionable
why a particular group of payers should bear this burden.
As a result of hospitals' efforts to contain costs, changes
in clinical practice have occurred. More emphasis is being
placed on outpatient services, preadmission testing, same-day
surgery and follow-up care after discharge. There certainly
are not as many frills or fringes as in the past."3 While it is
expected that this type of response decreases total health care
costs, there is also evidence that the frail, elderly population
is at risk for compromised quality of care, difficulty in accessing care and critical decisions with respect to the allocation
of resources. These patients may be discharged from the hospital sicker and quicker with more unresolved health
problems. 4 A frequently encountered situation pertains to
decisions regarding resuscitation and the application of advanced life-support systems, particularly with the elderly.
"The primary care physician is frequently caught between
conflicts of potential benefit to the individual patient and cost
to society to provide that benefit.""'
The current prospective payment system further promotes discrimination against "very old" Medicare beneficiaries. The new system does not take into account that the
average length of hospital stay increases with age, a factor
which reflects increased cost."6 In addition, the PPS does not
recognize multiple clinical problems or severity of illness.
Since the "oldest" elderly often exhibit serious, multiple
medical problems, hospital administrators may view them as
undesirable revenue losers.
Is the pressure from administrators, to practice more efficiently, forcing practitioners to make unethical decisions
about care? Will the incentives created by the PPS lead hospitals to turn away "unprofitable" patients, such as the frail,
elderly? If admitted, will they receive treatment that is "second class?" Will expensive, new technology be used only on
those patients thought to be "salvable?" These issues of eth13. Prospective Plan Needs Public Awareness, 57 Hosp. 19 (May 16,
1983).
14. Newcomer, Wood & Sankar, Medicare Prospective Payment: Anticipating Effect on Hospitals, Other Community Agencies and Families, 10 J.
HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & LAw 275-82 (1985).
15. Jahnigan & Schrier, The Doctor/Patient Relationship in Geriatric
Care, 2 CLINICS IN GERIATRIC MED. 457, 459 (1986).
16. HCFA Annual Report to Congress, (1984).
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ics, quality and legality, regarding care under the new system,
have been recognized by the Health Care Financing Administration as potential undesirable outcomes."7
C.

Providers' Response to Medicare Prospective Payment

While the full effect of the new Prospective Payment System
(PPS) will not be felt for years, its incentives have already begun to change the ways in which hospitals operate. One way
hospitals have responded to the new Medicare reimbursement policy has been the close monitoring of length of stay.
Daily reports from administration tell physicians how many
days of a hospitalization remain for patients. Care is to be
planned appropriately. Services which have been traditionally
subsidized and important in the care of the elderly, such as
social services, nutritional counselling and occupational therapy have been cut back.
For some elderly, early discharge may be appropriate.
Adequate discharge planning requires the assessing of the patient's needs and resources, counselling the patient and his
family about decision making and connecting them with the
appropriate community resources. Patient involvement in the
decision making is especially important.
However, the shift to earlier discharges can also result in
more severely ill patients being discharged prematurely into
the community. This results in greater burden on nursing
homes, home health agencies, rehabilitation centers and families. Patients requiring skilled nursing care are often older
and have multiple chronic illnesses. Early discharge of patients with intense nursing care needs, from acute care hospitals, has been cited as the reason for the limited availability of
skilled-care beds in nursing homes.l 8
In addition to a lack of available beds, nursing homes
have turned patients away because of a lack of adequate resources or services to meet the patients' needs. Hospitals have
traditionally provided "high tech" care, while nursing homes
have provided "high touch" care. PPS is changing this situation. It is not unusual for a patient to be discharged to their
home or to a skilled nursing facility. There has been little, if
any, time to prepare personnel practicing in nursing homes
or in home health agencies to care for these specialized
17. id.
18. Meiners & Coffey, Hospital DRGs and the Need for Long Term Care
Services: An Empirical Analysis, 20 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 359-83 (1985).

19881

THE MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM

needs. There is also less time for health professionals to
counsel the patient and family. Such provider responses have
serious implications for the quality of care delivered to the
aged.
III.

MAINTAINING

QUALITY IN A COST-CONSCIOUS

REIMBURSEMENT ENVIRONMENT

There are numerous examples of business, labor, and political interests organizing coalitions in states where the
problems of rising health care costs, charge shifting, quality
care and access have reached critical proportions. Pennsylvania has recently passed legislation creating a Health Care
Cost Containment Council. An innovative feature of this legislation is the measuring of provider service effectiveness,
which is defined by the Act as "the effectiveness of services
rendered by a provider, determined by measurement of medical outcome of patients grouped by severity receiving those
services." 19
This data provides information to individual providers
regarding the incidence of medical and surgical procedures
in the population, mortality and morbidity rates, infection
rates, readmission rates, and the rate of incidence of post discharge professional care for all specified diagnoses according
to their severity. These rates of occurrence, when coupled
with data on increases in severity throughout the course of
hospitalization, are indicative of the care provided. The comparative data, controlling for severity of illness, allows the
Council to evaluate who can deliver quality care at less cost.
Peer Review Organizations (PROs) have also recognized
the value of evaluating the quality of care through severity
measures. In a recent study conducted by Ernst and Whinney
it was found that PROs generally believed the refinement of
quality screens coupled with severity measures would enhance the effectiveness of the organization in screening for
problems. 20 A severity of illness system would differentiate
between cases failing the quality screens due to the level of
illness and those cases indicating poor quality of care.
19. Health Care Cost Containment Act, 1986 PA. LAWS 89 (emphasis
added).
20. Press release by C. Davis, Ernst and Whinney Survey of PROs
Reveals New Insights Into Quality of Care Measures (1987).
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Suggestions for an Alternative Payment Formula

The severity of illness adjustment which is used to identify specific quality differences among providers can be applied to create equitable reimbursement for legitimate cost
differences among hospitals. Given the fact that the DRG patient classification scheme does not fully account for the differences in case mix or the increasing severity of illnesses in
the elderly, if the excess costs for treating these patients are
justifiable, an irrational distribution of payments is occurring
and an incentive to compromise the care of this population is
present. An adjustment of the DRG average for severity of
illness would provide hospitals with a level of payment appropriate for the resources required to treat these patients. It is
clear that prospective payment will cause hospital providers
to alter their decisions about the allocation of resources in
the production of hospital services, but reimbursement rates
need not be applied in an arbitrary manner. An average
DRG rate might overpay those hospitals treating the less severely ill and underpay those hospitals which treat a disproportionate number of more severely ill patients. The distribution of severely ill patients is not evenly distributed according
to studies measuring the severity of illness within DRGs
across hospitals."
Under the PPS, PROs are mandated to review findings
of inappropriate or substandard care, but this review function would be unnecessary if financial disincentives were corrected. A modification of the current reimbursement formula
would reduce the inappropriate over or underfinancing of
hospital services and provide consistent incentives to hospitals
to appropriately treat the frail elderly population.
TABLE I shows the impact of prospective payment on
total hospital operating costs using the current PPS formula
versus the suggested formula based on payments for severity

ENG.

21.
J.

Horn, Buckley, Sharkey, Chambers, Horn & Schramm, 313
20-4 (July 4, 1985).

MED.

NEw
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adjusted DRGs.22 Financial and discharge data, including severity of illness scores, were collected for all patient discharges at 14 teaching and non-teaching hospitals across the
United States for fiscal year 1984. The hospitals in the study
represented both urban and community institutions. Reimbursement for Medicare patients was computed using the
current DRG reimbursement policy. In addition, payment
rates were calculated to simulate a payment system which sets
four specific rates for each level of severity within each DRG.
If the severity of illnesses among patients was evenly distributed across hospitals we would expect very little difference
between the alternative payment systems as the actual costs
would average out at each hospital and the current DRG payment rates would be appropriate. If the severity of illnesses
are not randomly distributed, however, the two formulae
produce a different distribution of payments. That is, the severity adjusted DRG payments should be lower for those hospitals with lower patient severity levels and higher for those
hospitals which treat a patient population of greater severity.
A comparison of the alternate payment rates shows that
22.

TABLE I
E[PACr ON PROSPECrIVE PAYMENT
OVERPAYMENTS AND UNDERPAYMENTS AS A
PERCENT OF TOTAL OPERATING COSI8
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Center for Hospital Finance & Management, Johns Hopkins Medical Institution, Baltimore, Md. Research funded by Health Care Financing Administration Grant No. 18-P-98378-01.
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the current formula overpays Hospitals 1, 3, 5, 6, 10 and 11,
and underpays Hospitals 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 12-14. When an
adjustment for severity is added to DRGs the following
occurs:
(1) Of the six hospitals previously overpaid, four hospitals (1, 5, 6, and 10) are overpaid, but at a lesser rate; two
hospitals (3 and 11) are underpaid, indicating their "windfall" was due to treating less severely ill populations.
(2) Of the eight hospitals previously underpaid, six hospitals (2, 4, 9, and 12-14) continue to be underpaid but at lesser
amounts; i.e. their shortfall is significantly reduced; and two
hospitals (7 and 8) are now overpaid.
This last phenomenon is a good example of underpaying
the wrong hospitals. These providers were not only treating a
more seriously ill population, but were also providing care in
a cost-efficient manner.
It is useful to point out the characteristics of Hospital 7
which are illustrative of the problems providers face in the
treatment of the frail elderly. The Medicare population at
this hospital represents over 25 percent of the total caseload
treated. If this population continues to be a revenue loser, as
it is under the current DRG average cost formula, the ethical
and equitable questions of access for these patients persist. If
an alternative payment formula were implemented, the hospital reimbursement would be adjusted to cover the higher
costs of treating these patients and the perverse incentives go
away.
CONCLUSION

A prospective payment system provides incentives for
hospitals to be more cost conscious in the treatment of patients. However, such a system should be equitable so that
hospitals will be reimbursed adequately, but not excessively,
for the care provided. The cost-containment goals of the
Medicare Prospective Payment System require that attention
be given to the issues of quality of care and access. The PPS
was designed to provide incentives for the efficient provision
of hospital inpatient health care. PPS was not intended, however, to replace quality objectives with financial objectives,
nor was it intended to reduce the number of Medicare patients accepted by hospitals.
These issues are particularly important to an increasingly
large segment of the American population, the frail elderly.
A potential gap exists in the continuity of care provided to
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this group. Shorter lengths of stay raise ethical and legal issues with respect to the potential for compromises in the
quality of care, the accessibility of care (both with respect to
availability and personal costs), premature discharge, the increased responsibility of nursing home personnel (or transfer
of responsibility to nursing homes, families, etc.), and the refusal of admissions to hospitals and/or nursing homes. We
have shown how a severity of illness adjustment to the DRG
average cost reimbursement formula would reduce or remove some of the negative incentives hospitals currently are
facing.
There are obvious dilemmas associated with cutting
costs. Those who implement medical cost containment policies will ultimately have to face the painful choice of cutting
costs or jeopardizing quality. From the standpoint of society,
which entity ultimately makes these decisions raises further
ethical and legal considerations. Given the current direction
of Medicare policy, what kind of financial protection will
Medicare beneficiaries have twenty years from today? How
will the increasing number of elderly, and especially frail elderly, be cared for? Who will finance acute and sub-acute care
for these elderly? What kind of access will they have to services? These are real challenges for the designers of Medicare
financial policy as they seek to contain rising medical costs
while ensuring the viability of the program in the future.

